

DEMOCRITUS ON POLITICS AND THE CARE OF THE SOUL: APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

The following texts and comments are a supplement to 'Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul', *CQ* 39 (1989), 307–31 (henceforth 'Democritus on Politics').¹ The Democritean fragments there were quoted only in translation; detailed commentary on them would have taken up too much space and clogged the argument. They make their appearance here in the same order as they did there, preceded by a thumb-nail *résumé* of that argument and of their place in it. Text, spelling and numbering is that of the standard edition: H. Diels, W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ (Berlin, 1951–2). Reference will also be made to collections by P. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokritos* (Marburg, 1893), S. Y. Luria, *Democritea* (Leningrad, 1970) and G. Ibscher, *Demócrito y sus sentencias sobre ética y educación* (Lima, 1983–4), as well as to translations by V. E. Alfieri, *Gli Atomisti* (Bari, 1936), K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Presocratics* (Oxford, 1948) and J. Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, 1987).

The political fragments of Democritus have come down to us out of context. The choice of any one as a starting-point for a discussion of them is bound to be arbitrary. But a good many can be linked to B 252 with its message that private well-being depends on the well-being of the state. Protection of the public well-being is the underlying concern of his political fragments. One obvious way to protect it is to crack down on anything that threatens it. Hence the fragments (B 257–60) about killing public pests, animal or human.

The same concerns emerge from the texts on democracy and public office. Democritus avowedly preferred democracy to the collective tyranny of 'dynasts' (B 251). How liberal or egalitarian that makes him is another matter. If the 'bad' are better kept out of high office (B 254), the pros and cons of going into public life present the 'man of worth' with a conundrum which he is bound to get wrong (B 253). Successful public service may be rewarded (B 263). But the blunders of a magistrate are what people rightly remember (B 265). And he may well find himself unprotected in the exercise of his proper punitive functions (B 266).

Democritus had no qualms himself about condemning the guilty, as one amusing fragment (B 159) indicates. Failure 'to do what is needful' and condemn the wrong-doer is itself a form of wrong-doing (B 256, 261, 262) – the idea probably began life in the law-courts (see §4). Refusal to do the right thing will lie 'on the heart' of the juror (B 262). He will suffer, in other words, from a 'guilty conscience'. Three fragments (B 174, 215, 297) touch on this psychological phenomenon.

Elsewhere, too, questions of public order lead to questions of personal psychology, since the effectiveness of the city and its institutions depends on the character of its

¹ 'Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul' began life as a chapter, excluded from the final version, of a Ph.D. thesis on Democritean ethics. After a long interval, part of the chapter was revived for a paper read to a meeting of the B Club in Cambridge in May 1988, and gradually evolved into the present article, assisted by invaluable comments from M. Burnyeat, P. Cartledge, R. Coleman, A. Dihle, P. Garnsey, M. Reeve and the Editors of *CQ*.

citizens. Laws, for instance, are meant to do people good (B 248). But they can only work if people are convinced that they should obey them (B 181, 41). Hence the importance of education which serves, at the primary level, to inculcate *αἰδώς*, a reluctance to incur the moral disapproval of others (B 178, 179). This reluctance is 'what most sustains virtue'. Democritus refined and internalized the concept to one of 'αἰδώς for oneself' (B 264, 144, 84). The implication of texts like B 264 or B 181 is that the ultimate remedy for social disorder lies less in coercion than in the care of individual souls.

Again, if states are to prosper or even survive, concord among the citizens is essential (B 250). Discord is fatal (B 249), and the danger of discord makes it necessary to have repressive laws (B 245). But Democritus could also offer a more positive prescription for civic concord, in voluntary generosity on the part of the rich (B 255). He was to be credited with the assertion that there are only two gods, *Poena* and *Beneficium* (A 76 = Pliny, *NH* 2.14). Perhaps they symbolized for him the two fundamental bonds of society (cf. Theophrastus ap. Stob. 4.1.72). If the need for punishment is a recurrent theme in the fragments, B 255 reveals the more amiable side of his social thought. Other fragments deal with liberality and the right motive for doing favours (B 282, 96).

Any detailed examination of Democritus' *fragmenta moralia* needs a few preliminary remarks about their transmission and chances of being authentic. Unlike other remains of Presocratic philosophy, they have come down to us almost entirely through anthologies. Only two of the fragments discussed below, B 157 and 159, are quotations by a later writer in his own writings; and the chances are that the writer, Plutarch, may himself have come across them as extracts. Our principal sources for Democritus' *moralia* are in fact two anthologies, the enormous compilation made by John of Stobi ('Stobaeus')² and a bundle of 86 short sentences entitled 'Gnomai of Democrates'. (The corruption of 'Democritus' to 'Democrates' occurs in various other places: see below, on B 178.) Both Stobaeus (4.50.80f.) and Democrates (48, 85, etc.) are capable of crediting Democritus with sentences demonstrably by some other writer. But these misdemeanours are generally seen as exceptions, rather than the rule. Texts ascribed to Democritus by Stobaeus and Democrates may be presumed innocent until proved guilty.³

In 'Democritus on Politics' §1, I claimed that ancient anthologies offered broadly two kinds of material: excerpts, often ample, from famous authors, assembled for the convenience of later *littérateurs*, and short aphoristic sentences designed to edify and instruct. The Democrates Collection consists entirely of such sentences. Stobaeus assigns, in addition, a number of longer passages to Democritus. The relation between the two kinds of Democritean material is disputed. My own view is that the longer fragments are a more trustworthy indication of how Democritus wrote, and that the shorter pieces, far from being composed as isolated aphorisms, began life in the same kind of prose as the longer fragments, but have suffered, in the course of

² *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium*, ed. C. Wachsmuth, O. Hense (Berlin, 1884–1909). For a clear, succinct account of the Stobaeus MSS, see *Plutarchi Moralia* VII ed. F. H. Sandbach (Teubner; Leipzig, 1967), pp. viif.

³ The opposite holds good for purportedly Democritean sentences in Byzantine gnomologies such as the *corpus Parisinum profanum* (= Democritus B 302 DK) or the '*Gnomologium Byzantinum ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου Ἰσοκράτους Ἐπικτήτου*' (DEI), reconstructed by C. Wachsmuth (*Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien* [Berlin, 1882], 162–216) from four surviving gnomologies. Where these overlap with material in Stobaeus, Democrates or Plutarch (see below, on B 157), they can be taken as versions (usually feeble) of something genuinely Democritean. Where they do not, they have no guarantee of authenticity.

their transmission, from serious abbreviation and sometimes distortion. (See the discussions of B 181, 43 and Democrates 80, of B 264, 244 and 84.) All of which detracts from their value. The political fragments discussed below, however, are most of them relatively long extracts from Stobaeus. Even so, they have come down to us out of context; their text in places is vile;⁴ and they need to be treated with considerable caution. The following pages may perhaps provide an introduction to the complexities of this material.

TEXTS AND COMMENTS

B 252 = Stob. 4.1.43

τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεῶν τῶν λοιπῶν μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅπως ἄξεται εὖ, μήτε φιλονεικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν ἑαυτῶι περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη ὀρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα ἓνι, καὶ τούτου σωιζομένου πάντα σωίζεται καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθίρεται.

To affairs of state one should, above all else, attach the greatest importance, that it be well ordered, neither engaging in contentions beyond what is reasonable nor appropriating personal power beyond the common good. For the state well ordered is the greatest source of success, and all depends on this. If this is saved, all is saved; if this is destroyed, all things are destroyed.

καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθίρεται: cf. B 287 = Stob. 4.40.20: ἀπορίη ξυνὴ τῆς ἐκάστου χαλεπωτέρη· οὐ γὰρ ὑπολείπεται ἐλπίς ἐπικουρίας.

The fragment is a carefully constructed piece of *Kunstprosa*. Each of its two sentences, linked by word-echo to each other (μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅπως ἄξεται εὖ, εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη), opens with its main clause, to which a much shorter clause is appended. In the first sentence, this is followed by a pair of clauses complementary in content and closely matching each other in syntax and wording (μήτε – participle – παρὰ τό...). In the second sentence, the thought and vocabulary of the second clause (καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντα ἓνι) is twice repeated and varied in two further clauses which exactly match each other, apart from one tiny variation (καὶ τούτου σωιζομένου πάντα σωίζεται, καὶ τούτου διαφθειρομένου τὰ πάντα διαφθίρεται). The result is a *τρίκωλον* with its weight on the final ‘member’, ramming home the supreme importance of ‘the state well ordered’. Such repetitive *abundantia*, is a hallmark of Democritean prose (cf. Th. Birt, ap. Natorp, pp. 181f. It was to be a recognised feature of the ‘ornate’ style, cf. Cic. *de or.* 3.53).

B 257 = Stob. 4.2.15

κατὰ δὲ ζώων ἔστιν ὧν φόνου καὶ μὴ φόνου ὥδε ἔχει· τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα ἀδικεῖν ἀθώιος ὁ κτείνων, καὶ πρὸς εὖεστοῦν τοῦτο ἔρδειν μᾶλλον ἢ μή.

Concerning the slaughter or non-slaughter of certain animals, the rule is as follows: he who kills those which do or are disposed to do harm goes scot-free, and to do so shall be for well-being rather than otherwise.

ζώων ἔστιν ὧν: does this mean that there are other animals to whom this rule does *not* apply? Perhaps. As J. Bernays claimed (*Theophrast über die Frömmigkeit* [Berlin, 1866], p. 149), Democritus is invoking a distinction, of the kind ascribed to Pythagoras (Plut. 964f), between dangerous wild animals, e.g. ‘foxes and reptiles’ (B 259), lions and wolves (Hermarchus ap. Porph. *abst.* 1.11), which may be killed

⁴ In what follows, I have kept the apparatus criticus of the fragments to a minimum. For fuller information, see Diels-Kranz or Wachsmuth-Hense.

with impunity, and gentler domesticated animals. Cf. R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig, 1902), p. 215 n. 1. You kill snakes and scorpions on sight (Ps.-Demosth. 25.96). But you had better wait before killing a threatening ox or horse. It probably belongs to someone, and will be under legal protection.

φόνου καὶ μὴ φόνου: note the double phrase, where *φόνου* would have sufficed on its own. As we have seen in B 252, Democritus likes to express himself in duplicate (cf. B 259 *κιναδέων τε καὶ ἐρπετέων*) or even triplicate (cf. B 259 *ιερὰ...καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι*, B 260 *αὐτοχειρίῃ καὶ κελεύων καὶ νήφωι*). One is frequently left with the problem of how much weight to attach to each member of such phrases or how far to treat them as pleonasms, as in the phrase which follows.

τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα ἀδικεῖν might be simply a long-winded way of saying ‘dangerous animals’, were it not that *θέλοντα* makes the important point, applied to human threats at B 68 and 87, that you need not and should not wait for damage to be done, before taking action. This leads, in its turn, to the broader question of ‘intentions’ in Democritean ethics. See ‘Democritus on Politics’, §2.

ἀδικέοντα: in the context of animal behaviour, *ἀδικεῖν* means ‘misbehave’ or, more commonly, ‘harm, damage’ (Xen. *Eq.* 6.3, Aristot. *HA* 9.44, 629b25–9, Theocr. 8.64; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.26); *δίκαιος* implies working properly (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.26) or behaving properly (Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5. The Pharsalian mare *Δικαία*, twice mentioned by Aristotle (586a13, 1262a24), whose foals all resembled their fathers, will have derived her name on the principle of *human* justice, *sum cuique reddere*!).

ἀθώιος: a legal *terminus technicus* (Friedländer, *Hermes* 48 [1913], 613 n. 3, cites Dittenberger² 933.14 and Ziehen, *Leges Sacrae* ii.110: τὸν δοῦλον μαστιγώσαντα ἀθώιον εἶναι) meaning ‘unmulcted’, ‘scot free’, *A θωιή* is strictly a ‘fine’, as in B 262.

καὶ πρὸς εὖεστοῦν τοῦτο ἔρδειν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ: these final words are elliptical and ambiguous. Here as in the previous clause, a copula has to be supplied, perhaps *ἀν εἴη* (as in B 260) or just *ἐστὶ*, perhaps *ἔστω* or *ἔσται* in the sense of ‘it shall be’ (cf. B 258). Democritus could be describing what happens or prescribing what ought to happen.

πρὸς εὖεστοῦν: whose? As Vlastos (*Phil. Rev.* 54 [1945], 583 n. 29) points out, *εὖεστώ* can mean either social or individual ‘well-being’ (compare Aesch. *Ag.* 647 with 929). Democritus might be saying simply, as Alfieri (p. 256) understands him, that the killing of dangerous animals ‘contribuisce al benessere [*comune*]’, is a public service (which, of course, it is). More probably, he is claiming that it should also enhance the private well-being of their killer. In the next fragment, the slayer of *τὰ πημαίνοντα* is to have a greater share of *δίκη*, *θάρσος* etc. Note also Hesychius’ curious etymology of *εὖεστώ* as *εὐδαιμονία ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ ἐστάναι τὸν οἶκον* (B 140), which strongly suggests that Democritean *εὖεστώ* was a domestic rather than a public felicity (cf. the juxtaposition of *οἶκος* and *πόλις* at Plato, *Prt.* 318c).

μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ: ‘rather than to *ill*-being, *κακεστώ*’? Or ‘rather than not to do so’ (Barnes)?

B 258 = Stob. 4.2.16

κτείνειν χρὴ τὰ πημαίνοντα παρὰ δίκην πάντα περὶ παντός· καὶ ταῦτα ὁ ποιῶν εὐθυμίας καὶ δίκης καὶ θάρσεως καὶ κτήσεως ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ μέζω μοῖραν μετέξει.

εὐθυμίας Wakefield, DK: ἐπιθυμίας MSS

It is needful to kill those creatures which do damage contrary to right, all of them at all costs. And he who does this shall have a greater share of good cheer, of rights, of security and of property in every order.

τὰ πημαίνοντα (sc. ζῶια) παρὰ δίκην: another pleonasm? Or are there creatures which do damage *κατὰ δίκην*? Yes, if *δίκη* is taken in its primitive sense of what is ‘the rule’, what is ‘normal’ and hence right and proper (see K. Latte, ‘Der Rechtsbegriff im archaischen Griechentum’, *Antike und Abendland* 2 [1946], 65). It was *δίκη* for Homeric kings to misuse their power (*Od.* 4.691). Similarly, wolves and foxes that wreak havoc in the forest are not behaving *παρὰ δίκην*. It is when they encroach on the sheep-fold and the hen-run that they need to be killed ‘all of them at all costs’. (Contrast the interpretation of E. A. Havelock. *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* [London, 1957], p. 130, that by “contrary to right” he indicates the violation of another’s security’, and of C. Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking* [Cambridge, 1988], p. 250, that ‘to injure in violation of justice is to harm a creature which has neither done any harm nor intends any’. On this view of *παρὰ δίκην*, a carnivore would be violating justice every time that it had a meal.)

εὐθυμίας: Wakefield’s emendation is probably right. We find the same corruption of *εὐθυμία* to *ἐπιθυμία* in Theodoretus’ account of the Democritean τέλος at *gr. cur. aff.* 11.6. Very occasionally, however, *ἐπιθυμία* can mean the *object* of desire (as in the phrase *κατεργάζεσθαι, κτήσασθαι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν*: ‘to get one’s desire’ at *Athen.* 285f, 295a); and it is just possible to take the MS text here as saying ‘a greater portion of what he wants’, ‘of his heart’s desire’.

καὶ ταῦτα ὁ ποιῶν...μέζω μοῖραν μεθέξει: text (see DK *ad loc.*) and thought are disputed. The slayer of πημαίνοντα ‘shall have a greater share’ of *εὐθυμία*, *δίκη*, *θάρσος* and *κτῆσις*. The phrase *μοῖραν μεθέξει* occurs also in B 263 (*δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς μεγίστην μοῖραν μεθέξει*) and twice in Herodotus, where it means ‘having a share’ of something to which one can lay claim – of land (1.204.1), of political privilege (4.145.4; cf. the phrase *μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας* at Aristotle, *Pol.* 1268a24, 27, 1293a3). Hence Diels translated *μοῖραν μετέχειν* in B 258 and 263 as ‘beanspruchen dürfen’, ‘Anspruch haben an’. But while *κτῆσις* clearly is something which can be claimed and awarded, *εὐθυμία*, *δίκη*, *θάρσος* and *ἀρετή*, in their different ways, look like states of mind. For that reason, W. Nestle (*Philologus* 67 [1908], 547f.) preferred to translate *μοῖραν μετέχειν* as ‘Anteil haben an’ ‘participate in’. This would seem to imply that the slayer of public pests in B 258 will be a jollier, juster, more confident and richer person, in the same way that the man in B 263 will be ‘the justest and most virtuous’. Which is possible, though it led Nestle to go further and interpret *μοῖρα* as a *contribution* towards the *public* *εὐθυμία*, *δίκη* etc. These nouns, however, can all refer to apportionable advantages: *δίκη* can mean ‘civic rights’ (cf. Tyrtaeus 12.39f: *βλάβπτειν οὐτ’ αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει*); *θάρσος* as ‘security’ or ‘grounds for confidence’ (cf. Aesch. *Sept.* 270) can be virtually equivalent to *ἄδεια* or *ἀσφάλεια* (cf. the Epicurean use of *θαρρεῖν* at *RS* 40 etc.); while even *εὐθυμία* can have the objective sense of delicacies at a banquet, material ‘good cheer’ (Page, *PMG* 926 (*adesp.* 8): *δοσις εὐθυμῆ καὶ χάρις ἥδεται*; Pind. *O.* 2.34; Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.13, 18, 5.7). A ‘greater share’ of it will mean something like ‘extra helpings at public banquets’. Cf. Xenophanes B 2.14 and the Athenian practice of honouring public benefactors with *σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ* (Aristoph. *Eq.* 280–3, *Pax* 1084, Plato, *Ap.* 36d; Isoc. 15.95; Plutarch, *V. Solon* 24.3). In B 258, not only will the pesticide enjoy a greater amount of property; he will have an increase of ‘civil rights’ and security, as well as the lion’s share at public banquets. See, further, the note on B 263. The alliterative phrase *μοῖραν μεθέξει* in both fragments recalls Heraclitus B 25: *μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζοντας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι*. J. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 2, 127 points to the use of assonance in B 258 with its ‘elaborate pattern of π, κ and μ’ as a feature of early philosophical prose.

ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ means the same as in B 259, 'in every *social* order' (*contra* J. Kerschensteiner, *Kosmos* [München, 1962], p. 171).

B 259 = Stob. 4.2.17

ὁκωσπερ περὶ κινადέων τε καὶ ἔρπετέων γεγράφεται τῶν πολεμίων, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι χρεῶν εἶναι ποιεῖν· κατὰ νόμους τοὺς πατρίους κτείνειν πολέμιον, ἐν παντὶ κόσμῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ νόμος ἀπείργει· ἀπείργει δὲ ἱερὰ ἐκάστοις ἐπιχώρια καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι.

γεγράφεται MSS: γέγραπται Natorp: γέγραφα Langerbeck

As has been written about enemies in the form of foxes and reptiles, so too it seems to me needful to act in the case of men: in accordance with ancestral laws to kill the enemy, in every social order in which law does not debar it. (In fact, it is prevented by sanctuaries in each country, and by treaties and oaths.)

κινადέων: strictly 'foxes'. Sicilian in origin, the word is more commonly applied to foxy humans (Andoc. 1.99; Ar. *Av.* 430. *Nu.* 448, etc.).

ἐρπετέων: note the story in Herodotus (4.105.1) of how the Neuroi were driven out of their country by an infestation of snakes. The link between snakes and foxes is that both live in holes – which is why, according to Aristotle (*HA* 610a12), they are friends.

πολεμίων... πολέμιον: public enemies who can lawfully and without impiety be slaughtered. Cf. Plut. *V. Lycurg.* 28.4: Spartan ephors, on coming into office, would declare war on the helots, so as to make it *εὐαγές* to kill them (= Aristotle fr. 538), and Cleobulus ap. Stob. 3.1.172 (= DK 10.3). *a.* 15: τὸν τοῦ δήμου ἐχθρὸν πολέμιον νομίζειν.

γεγράφεται is 3rd per. plural. Diels wished to introduce *νόμοι* as a subject for it ('Wie Gesetze erlassen sind'), Natorp and Langerbeck to emend. Whatever the exact text, there is clearly some reference here to the preceding fragments (see Deichgräber, *Philologus* 88 [1933], 349 n. 6), and the treatment for foxes and reptiles mentioned here will be that ordained there for noxious animals in general. Whether these ordinances were Democritus' own prescription or were merely reported by him, the following words make it clear that the application of the principle to human pests – cf. Aristotle's account (*Pol.* 1256b24f.) of hunting as a procedure properly used on animals and reluctant 'natural slaves' – is very much his own recommendation: οὕτω καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων δοκεῖ μοι χρεῶν εἶναι ποιεῖν.

δοκεῖ μοι χρεῶν εἶναι ποιεῖν: the variety of jussive expressions in this and in surrounding fragments is noteworthy. Compare the circumlocution here with a *χρή* and the future (*μεθέξει*) in B 258, with the optative (*ἀθώιος ἂν εἴη*) in B 260. Note also the gerund next to an infinitive in B 262 *καταψηφιστέον καὶ μὴ ἀπολύειν*.

ἐν ᾧ μὴ νόμος ἀπείργει: the awkwardly phrased qualification reads like a hastily inserted afterthought, prompted perhaps by *κατὰ νόμους τοὺς πατρίους*. It might lead to the distracting question, which is most unlikely to have been in Democritus' mind here, of how far, in a social order where there is no *νόμος* to prevent their killing, one could still go against the *νόμοι πάτριον* in killing them.

ἱερὰ: sanctuaries, temple-precincts in which a defeated enemy can take refuge (Hdt. 5.119.2, etc.). Killing him there or dragging him away to slaughter would be sacrilege.

καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι: together, the words imply a 'solemnly sworn truce' with 'libations' and 'oaths' confirming the cessation of hostilities.

B 260 = Stob. 4.2.18

κιξάλλον καὶ ληιστὴν πάντα κτείνων τις ἄθῳιος ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτοχειρίῃ καὶ κελεύων καὶ ψήφῳ.

Any one killing any brigand or pirate should go scot-free, whether he does so by his own hand, by orders, or by vote.

κιξάλλον καὶ ληιστὴν: as Natorp (p. 63) pointed out, these terms appear in the *Dirae Teïae* (Tod 23, Meiggs–Lewis 30), public imprecations engraved around 470 B.C. on a stele at Teos, the mother state of Abdera. Curses are directed at, amongst others, any one who *ἢ κιξαλλεύει ἢ κιξάλλας ὑποδέχοιτο ἢ ληίζοιτο ἢ ληιστὰς ὑποδέχοιτο* (B 18–21). ‘Piracy, like brigandage on land, was an easy resource for the hungry.... The social conditions of the ancient world, in which (in most periods) starvation and exile were common, provided a constant incentive’ (Badian, *OCD*, s.v. ‘Piracy’).

κτείνων τις ἄθῳιος ἂν εἴη: virtually a formula of outlawry. Cf. B 257 *ἄθῳιος ὁ κτείνων* (see above) and Plato, *Lg.* 874b (enumerating cases and conditions of justifiable homicide): *ὣν δὲ ὁ κτείνας ἐφ’ οἷς ... ὀρθῶς ἂν καθαρὸς εἴη*, and also the formula at Athens *νηποίνει ἀποκτείνειν* (Xen. *Hiero* 3.3), *νηποίνει τεθνάτω* (Andoc. 1.96, Demosth. 23.60).

αὐτοχειρίῃ καὶ κελεύων καὶ ψήφῳ: A. T. Cole (*Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology* [Ann Arbor, 1967], p. 129 n. 57) compares the language here with that of Antiphon 5.92: *τὴν ἴσῃν γε δύναμιν ἔχει ὅστις τε ἂν τῇ χειρὶ ἀποκτείνῃ ἀδίκως καὶ ὅστις τῇ ψήφῳ* and the text of the law at Andoc. 1.96f.: outlawing any one guilty of subverting the democracy: *... πολέμιος ἔστω Ἀθηναίων καὶ νηποίνει τεθνάτω ... ὁ δὲ ἀποκτείνας τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα καὶ ὁ συμβουλευσας ὅσιος ἔστω καὶ εὐαγής. ὁμόσαι δ’ Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας ... ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἔστω ὅδε ‘κτενῶ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ ψήφῳ καὶ τῇ ἐμμαντοῦ χειρὶ, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ, ὃς ἂν καταλύσῃ τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν Ἀθήνησι’*. F. Altheim, *Klio* 20 (1926), p. 265, recalls the distinction in Roman law between *minister* and *auctor*.

See, further, J. H. Paneris, ‘Die eigenhändige Tötung des Raubers bei Demokrit und des nächtlichen Einbrechers bei Platon’, *Philologus* 127 (1983), 298–302.

B 251 = Stob. 4.1.42

ἡ ἐν δημοκρατίῃ πενίη τῆς παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστησι καλεομένης εὐδαιμονίης τοσοῦτον ἐστὶ αἰρετωτέρη, ὅκσον ἐλευθερίῃ δουλείης.

Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to so-called prosperity among dictators as freedom is to slavery.

ἡ ἐν δημοκρατίῃ πενίη: *impoverishment* in a democracy? Perhaps Democritus is retorting to observations regularly made by the insecure, over-taxed rich about the advantages of being poor in a state run by and for the *dēmos* (cf. Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.13, Xen. *Symp.* 4.31f., Isoc. 8.128, etc.).

δυνάστησι: see ‘Democritus on politics’, §3.

εὐδαιμονίης ‘felicity’, ‘prosperity’, ‘high standard of living’ (cf. Plato, *Ep.* 7.326b on the *bios eudaimon* in Sicily).

ἐλευθερίῃ: a democratic slogan. Cf. Euripides, *Suppl.* 438, Plato, *Rep.* 557b, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1317a40, etc.

The sentence has survived completely out of context, and its point is a matter of speculation. ‘Conceivably, Democritus is saying no more than that freedom is preferable to wealth; but he may be referring to the hoarding of resources which in

a *δυναστεία* would nullify their usefulness' (A. T. Cole, *HSCP* 65 [1961], 152). One thing which the fragment is not meant to be is a *laus inopiae* or praise of the simple life of the common people, as claimed by G. Pugliese Caratelli (*H EN ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΗ ΠΕΝΗ*, *PP* 40 [(1985)], 426–30). Even without renouncing their property, the rich might feel freer and safer in a democracy than under a *δυναστεία*.

B 254 = Stob. 4.1.45

οἱ κακοὶ ἰόντες ἐς τὰς τιμὰς ὁκόσωι ἂν μᾶλλον ἀνάξιοι ἔοντες ἴωσι, τοσούτωι μᾶλλον ἀνακηδέες γίνονται καὶ ἀφροσύνης καὶ θράσεος πίμπλονται.

When the bad enter public office, the unworthier they are on entry, the more heedless they become, the fuller of folly and rashness.

ἀνακηδέες: 'heedless', 'free from care'. Burchard's emendation here as in B 174 is generally, and rightly, accepted. For the MSS readings, see DK *ad loc.* It does, however, mean positing a word that is otherwise unattested. Ernst Fränkel, *Z. f. vergl. Sprachf.* 42 (1909), 235 compares the pleonastic construction of ἀνακηδής (= ἀκηδής) with ἀνηστis (= νήστis 'fasting' but constructed on analogy with ἄσιτος), an adjective attested for Cratinus (fr. 45 Kock) and Aeschylus (fr. 433 Mette).

A number of shorter fragments may conceivably be making the same 'elitist' point. These include B 49 = Stob. 4.4.27 = Democrates 15: χαλεπὸν ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ χρεείονος: 'It is hard to be governed by an inferior', and B 267 = Stob. 4.6.19: φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκίῳ τῷ κρέσσονι: 'By nature, government belongs to the superior' (an all purpose maxim. The Athenians in Thucydides (1.76.2) justify their empire by it. Callicles invokes it in Plato's *Gorgias* (483d). It even plays a part in Seneca's Posidonia account of primeval kingship at *ep.* 90.4: 'naturaest enim potioribus deteriora summittere'). One might also cite B 75 = Stob. 4.2.13 = Democrates 40: κρέσσον ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ἢ ἄρχειν: 'Better for fools to be governed than to govern', though this is on the slightly different subject of the preeminence due to the wise, as is B 47 = Stob. 3.1.45 = Democrates 14 = DEI 64: νόμῳ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ σοφωτέρῳ εἴκειν κόσμιον, 'Yielding to law, to magistrate and the wiser man is the orderly thing to do'. Note also B 95 = Democrates 61, τιμαὶ παρὰ τοῖς εὐφρονέουσι μέγα δύνανται, οἱ ξυνίασι τιμώμενοι.

B 253 = Stob. 4.1.44

τοῖς χρηστοῖσιν οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέοντας τῶν ἑωυτῶν ἄλλα πρήσσειν· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια κακῶς ἔσχεν. εἰ δὲ ἀμελείῳ τις τῶν δημοσίων, κακῶς ἀκούειν γίνεται, καὶ ἦν μηδὲν μήτε κλέπτῃ μήτε ἀδικῃ, ἐπεὶ καὶ <μη> ἀμελέοντι ἢ ἀδικέοντι κίνδυνος κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ δὴ καὶ παθεῖν τι. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν· συγγινώσκεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐπετές.

καὶ <μη> ἀμελέοντι ἢ Meineke: καὶ ἀμελέοντι <καὶ κλέποντι> ἢ H. Gomperz

It is not in their interest for men of worth to neglect their own for other business; for their private business will go badly. But if a man neglects public business, he comes to have a bad reputation, even if he neither steals a thing nor does anything wrong; for even *without* negligence or wrong-doing there is a danger of bad reputation and indeed of punishment. One is bound to get it wrong. But it is not easy for men to admit this.

ἄλλα πρήσσειν: the implicit contrast is with τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράσσειν, conduct which Plato can identify with *σωφροσύνη* (*Charm.* 161d) and *δικαιοσύνη* (*Rep.* 433a).

κακῶς ἔσχεν: gnomic aorist.

καὶ ἦν μηδὲν μήτε κλέπτῃ μήτε ἀδικῃ: 'even if innocent of theft or

malpractice'. The vocabulary may have a legal ring to it. Embezzlement (κλοπή) and malpractice (ἀδίκιον) were financial offences for which officials at Athens could be prosecuted (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 54.2).

ἐπεὶ καὶ <μὴ> ἀμελούντι ἤ: something is missing from the text as transmitted. H. Gomperz' emendation καὶ ἀμελούντι <καὶ κλέπτοντι> ἢ ἀδικέοντι would make the clause say 'for negligence, as well as theft or wrongdoing, incurs a danger of bad reputation and indeed of punishment', with 'punishment' referring to some measure like the fines imposed in oligarchies on the rich for failing to attend the law-courts (Ar. *Pol.* 1294a38, 1298b17), assembly (1297a17) or council (Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 4.3, 30.6). In democratic Athens too (see Aristoph. *Arch.* 21f. and *Schol ad loc.*), there were penalties for shirking the assembly). This would simplify the argument, as well as making the choice before the 'man of worth' a bit less painful. Meineke's addition (followed by Diels–Kranz) of μὴ before ἀμελούντι gives an *a fortiori* argument: 'If you neglect public affairs, your reputation will suffer, since even if you do not neglect them, and even if you avoid wrong-doing, you are still in danger of incurring a bad reputation and possibly some penalty'. The merit of this emendation is that the resulting clause presents a situation – that of a conscientious and blameless magistrate finding himself none the less in danger – of which another substantial fragment (266) provides a clear example.

κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ δὴ καὶ παθεῖν τι: the two main kinds of sanction. Cf. B 265: κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ πάσχειν, and Antiphon 87 B 44.A 2.7: ... καὶ αἰσχύνῃς καὶ ζημίας.

συγγινώσκεσθαι: with H. Gomperz, I take this to mean 'acknowledge', 'admit' (cf. Hdt. 1.45.3). DK understand it as 'forgive', perhaps rightly. Cf. B 265 init.: 'mistakes are what people remember'. The interpretation of συγγινώσκεσθαι will depend on what you understand by ἀμαρτάνειν – making a mistake about going into public life (which is what men will not acknowledge), or making mistakes in the course of public life (for which they may wish to be forgiven).

B 263 = Stob. 4.5.45

δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς μεγίστην μετέχει μοῖραν ὁ τιμὰς ἀξίως τὰς μεγίστας ταμιεύων.

ἀξίως... ταμιεύων Th. Gomperz: ἀξίας... τάμων MSS

μεγίστην μετέχει μοῖραν: as in B 258, the phrase μοῖραν μετέχειν 'have a share of' implies 'have a claim to', 'Anspruch haben an'. Democritus is using δίκη and ἀρετή in an archaic sense. They are not personal qualities here (as αἰδώς and δίκη are at Plato, *Prt.* 322d, where τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν is to be killed as a 'disease of the state') so much as advantages or benefits which can be claimed, awarded, enhanced, infringed or removed (as at Tyrtaeus 12.39f: οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν βλάπτειν οὔτ' αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει or *Od.* 17.322f.: Zeus takes away half a man's ἀρετή when he falls into slavery. Cf. 18.251, 19.124; Hes. *Op.* 313). See above, on B 258. Contrast Nestle, *Philologus* 67 (1908), 547f.

ἀξίως... ταμιεύων: something is badly wrong with the text in the second half of the sentence. Of various proposed emendations, Gomperz' is the most economical.

B 265 = Stob. 4.5.47

τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ἀνθρωποὶ μεμνέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν εὖ πεπαισθημένων. καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον οὕτως· ὥσπερ <γὰρ τὸν> τὰς παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντα οὐ χρὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ πάσχειν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡιρέθη ὡς κακῶς ποιήσων, ἀλλ' ὡς εὖ.

Things done wrong are what men remember rather than things done well. And quite right too. For just as he who returns a deposit deserves no praise, while he who does not deserves a bad reputation and a bad time, so too with the magistrate. He was not elected to do things badly, but to do them well.

παράκαταθήκας: with the concept of the 'deposit' which simply must be returned, come what may (on which, see A. Ehrhardt, 'Parakatatheke', *Zeitschrift d. Savigny Stiftung f. Rechtsgeschichte* 75, *romanistische Abteilung* [1958], pp. 32–90), Greek thought came as close as it ever did to the notion of a 'categorical imperative'. Cf. the story in Herodotus (6.86) of Glaucus the Spartan, whose family was wiped out because he so much as dared to consult the Delphic Oracle about holding on to a deposit which he was due to surrender.

B 266 = Stob. 4.5.48

οὐδεμία μηχανή τῷ νῦν καθεστῶτι ρυθμῶι μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοὶ ἔωσιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλωι ἔοικεν ἢ φέωυτῶι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἐτέροισι γίγνεσθαι· δεῖ δέ κως οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κοσμηθῆναι, ὅκως ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικέων, ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐτάζηι τοὺς ἀδικέοντας, μὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνους γενήσεται, ἀλλὰ τις ἢ θεσμός ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀμυνεῖ τῷ τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖντι.

ἐωυτῶι τὸν αὐτὸν (S τῶν αὐτῶν MA) ἐφ' ἐτέροισι γίγνεσθαι MSS: ἐωυτῶι τὸν <ἄρχοντα εἶναι ὑπεύθυνον οὐδ' ἐτέρων ἄρξαντα μεθ' ἐνιαυτὸν> αὐτὸν κτλ. Diels: τῷ τὸν ἀετὸν ἐπ' ἐρπετοῖσι γίγνεσθαι Th. Gomperz ἐφ' MSS: ὑφ' Jacobs

There is no device in the present shape of society to stop wrong-doing of magistrates, however thoroughly good they may be... These matters too should somehow be so ordered, that the doer of nothing wrong, however thoroughly he examine wrong-doers, should not fall into their power, but rather some statute or something else should protect the doer of what is right.

μηχανή: cf. B 173 fin. 'Deep water meant a danger of drowning, but a *μηχανή* was found in the form of swimming lessons.' In the present political context, it will take the form of a *θεσμός* or some other legal device.

ρυθμῶι: a term with a variety of metaphorical meanings, it has the sense here of 'social order'. Virtually equivalent to *κόσμος* in B 258 and 259, it is picked up by *κοσμηθῆναι* in the final sentence.

ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας: are the *ἄρχοντες* subjects or objects of *ἀδικεῖν*? On the strength of the final sentence, most interpreters (with the notable exception of K. Freeman, pp. 115f.), see them as the objects, and understand the words as 'wrong done to the magistrates'. (Natorp went so far as to correct *ἀδικεῖν* to *ἀδικεῖσθαι*.) But this interpretation takes away the point of the concessive clause which follows (*ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοὶ ἔωσιν*), since there is nothing unusual about good men being victims of wrong, whereas it is odd for them to be the perpetrators. A lot depends here on the meaning of *ἀδικεῖν*, which can cover anything from a crime like theft (cf. B 253) to mere negligence. (See MacDowell on Aristophanes *V*. 896.) The magistrates here may be guilty of no more than 'not doing what is needful', a very Democritean sort of injustice (see B 256 and 'Democritus on Politics', §4). In this case, *ἀδικεῖν* here implies something different from the positive wrong-doing of *ἀδικέων* and *ἀδικέοντας* in the last sentence.

ἦν καὶ πάνυ...: the parallel use of this phrase in the first and the final sentence strongly suggests that, for the magistrate, being thoroughly good and thoroughly investigating wrong-doers amount to much the same thing.

οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλωι ἔοικεν...: the sentence clearly offers some justification for what was said at the start of the fragment. Freeman, pp. 115f., taking the magistrates in the first sentence to be the subject of *ἀδικεῖν*, attempts to translate the text as it stands:

‘For it is not likely for anyone else (any more) than for oneself, that he will show himself the same man in different circumstances’, i.e. ‘power may corrupt even the best’. On this interpretation, the two halves of the fragment are concerned with different problems – wrongdoing by power-crazed magistrates, wrong done to innocent magistrates. This is perhaps possible – *καὶ ταῦτα* in the next sentence could be introducing a further point. But her translation of the Greek here is, to say the least, strained. Farrar (p. 258), understanding the first sentence as about wrong done to the magistrates and adopting Jacobs’ *ὑφ’*, tries: ‘It does not seem fitting for them to be subject to others, to any other than themselves’. But this is little more than a hopeful paraphrase. Diels, followed by Alfieri (p. 270 n. 678), posited a lacuna of about a line and credited Democritus with saying something like: ‘To no one other than himself is it proper that the <official should be answerable or that, having been in office over others, he should after a year> himself be at the mercy of others.’ Th. Gomperz’ proposal (*Sitzb. Ak. Wien* 83 [1876], p. 586), accepted by Luria (iii.579) and Ibscher (ii.368 n. 28), is at least more economical. Nor is it as odd as it might at first seem. Democritus, who mentions Aesop elsewhere (B 224), would not be the only philosopher to cite him in a political context. Antisthenes (fr. 100 Caizzi = Aristotle, *Pol.* 1284a15) did the same. The allusion here, as Gomperz suggests, is perhaps to a fable like that of the eagle and the snake (326 Hausrath–Hunger), recalled by Aristophanes (*Eq.* 197–201) and retold in Aelian (*N.A.* 17.37). The plight of magistrates at present, Democritus claims, ‘looks no different from that of an eagle grappling with snakes’. The point of the comparison is that the eagle (who, incidentally, is the bird of Zeus, god of justice) is no match for serpents with which he grapples. Magistrates faced with criminals are similarly outclassed. (*ἐρπετά* would be a good Democritean word for snakes (see B 259); I would prefer to understand *γίνεσθαι ἐπί* + dat, not as ‘fall into the power of’, but rather ‘busy oneself with’ as at Plato, *Rep.* 490d.)

καὶ ταῦτα: i.e. Democritus is offering one of several proposals for re-ordering ‘the present shape of things’. The reference of *ταῦτα* could simply be forward (as Freeman takes it), to the protection of *ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικέων*, More probably, ‘this too’ covers what has just been described.

ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικέων... τοὺς ἀδικέοντας: see the discussion of the fragment in ‘Democritus on Politics’, §3.

B 159 = Plutarch, *fr. de lib. et aegr.* 2

ἔοικε παλαιά τις αὕτη τῷ σώματι διαδικασία πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ τῶν παθῶν εἶναι. καὶ Δημόκριτος μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναφέρων τὴν κακοδαιμονίαν φησὶν, εἰ τοῦ σώματος αὕτη δίκην λαχόντος, παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ὧν ὠδύνηται <καὶ> κακῶς πέπονθεν, αὐτὸς γένοιτο τοῦ ἐγκλήματος δι<καστῆς>, ἥδεως ἂν καταψηφίσασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐφ’ οἷς τὰ μὲν ἀπώλεσε τοῦ σώματος ταῖς ἀμελείαις καὶ ἐξέλυσε ταῖς μέθαις τὰ δὲ κατέφθειρε καὶ διέσπασε ταῖς φιληδονίαις, ὥσπερ ὄργανον τινὸς ἢ σκεύους κακῶς ἔχοντος τὸν χρώμενον ἀφειδῶς αἰτιασάμενος. Θεόφραστος δὲ τοῦναντίον ἔφη τῷ σώματι πολλοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνοικεῖν, ὀλίγου χρόνου βαρεῖς μισθοὺς ὑποτελοῦσαν, τὰς λύπας τοὺς φόβους τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ζηλοτυπίας, αἷς συμφερομένη περὶ τὸ σῶμα δικαιότερον ἂν αὐτῷ δικάζοιτο πηρώσεως ὧν ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ βιαιῶν ἐφ’ οἷς κατέχεται, καὶ ὕβρεως ὧν ἀδοξεῖ καὶ λοιδορεῖται τῶν ἐκείνου κακῶν ἀναδεχομένη τὰς αἰτίας οὐ προσηκόντως.

This dispute of body *contra* soul in the matter of the passions would seem to be an ancient one. Democritus lays the blame for misfortune on the soul saying that ‘if the body were to file a claim against the soul for the lifelong pain and ill-treatment which it had suffered, and he himself had

to judge the complaint, he would gladly condemn the soul on charges of damaging it through negligence, of enervating it through drunkenness, of destroying and tearing it apart through sensuality, in the same way that, if an implement or piece of equipment were in bad condition, he would mercilessly put the blame on the user'. Theophrastus, on the contrary, says that the soul has an expensive residence in the body and for its short period there has to pay a heavy fine – pain, fear, desire, jealousy. Having these to contend with, it could more reasonably sue the body for mayhem through imposing forgetfulness on it, for forcible seizure in detaining it, for outrage in destroying its reputation and slandering it, wrongfully charging it with its own evils.

παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον ὧν ὠδύνηται...: note the hyperbaton. Cf. B 174, 181, 297, 250.

δίεσπασε: 'dis-tracted', 'torn apart'. Cf. Democritus' account of the sexual act: in *συνουσίῃ*,... *ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου... ἀποσπάται*, man is 'torn away from', 'abstracted' – from man (B 32).

ὥσπερ ὀργάνου τινὸς ἢ σκεύους κακῶς ἔχοντος τὸν χρώμενον ἀφειδῶς αἰτιασάμενος: H. Gomperz took these words to be Plutarch's. The comparison of the body with an 'implement' or 'vessel' chimes awkwardly with its depiction, in the preceding clauses, as a litigant. Moreover, the image of it as the 'implement' which the soul 'uses' is a Platonist commonplace (e.g. Plotinus 1.1.3.3) which goes back to the *Alcibiades* I (129e). But how consistent must the imagery be? Democritus is quite capable (B 223) of referring to the body as the *σκήνος* or 'tent' (i.e. 'what the soul lives in'), while still speaking of its 'demands' and 'longing' (*χρηρίζει, ἰμείρεται*).

ἀφειδῶς is usually construed with *τὸν χρώμενον*: 'the careless user'. Plutarch himself may have taken it in that way. He speaks in his other treatment of the theme (*san. tu.* 135e, quoted below) of how the soul *ἀφειδεῖ τοῦ σώματος*. All the same, I would prefer, taking the clause as more or less the words of Democritus, to construe the adverb with *αἰτιασάμενος*: 'would mercilessly blame', producing a parallel phrase to the previous *ἡδέως... καταψηφίσασθαι*.

The theme of the quotation from Democritus is the contrast, to be found elsewhere in the *fragmenta moralia* (B 149, 223, etc.) and much invoked by Epicurean writers (e.g. Epicurus *Gn.V.* 33, frs. 445, 456, 469 U; Diog. Oen. fr. 1.i-ii), between the readily satisfied wants of the body and the endless, perverse and vexing desires of the soul.

What distinguishes this fragment is its vivid personification. Democritus employs the device to telling effect elsewhere, in the retort of the senses to the 'wretched mind' at B 125. Other philosophers were to make occasional use of it, notably Cleanthes (*SVF* i.570). The passage of Plutarch which preserves our Democritean fragment was in its turn to inspire, in the fourteenth century, another forensic dispute between soul and body, the *Προσωποποιία* of Gregory Palamas (see W. Kranz, *RM* 118 [1955], 275–8). How long or consistently Democritus maintained the personification here is uncertain. Theophrastus, at all events, in his contrary, Platonizing account of the soul's complaints against the body (cf. Plato, *Phd.* 66b–c, *Tim.* 86e), continued the legal imagery with considerable thoroughness. *ὑβρις*, *βία* and *πήρωσις* (cf. Plato, *Lg.* 874e) were all indictable offences.

The conflict of opinion between Democritus and Theophrastus on the question of soul, body and human unhappiness must have found its way into Plutarch's notebooks or *ύπομνήματα*. He re-uses the material, more briefly and to different effect, at *de sanitate tuenda* 24 135e: *πρὸς τούτους* (sc. people who wantonly abuse their health) *γὰρ οἶμαι μάλιστα τὸν Δημόκριτον εἰπεῖν ὡς εἰ τὸ σῶμα δικάσαιτο τῇ ψυχῇ κακώσεως, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὴν ἀποφυγεῖν. ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι καὶ Θεόφραστος ἀληθὲς εἶπεν ἐν μεταφορᾷ πολὺ τῷ σώματι τελεῖν ἐνοίκιον τὴν ψυχὴν. πλείονα μὲντοι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολαύει κακὰ μὴ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῷ χρωμένης καὶ μηδ' ὡς*

προσῆκει θεραπευόμενον. ὅταν γὰρ ἐν πάθεισιν ἰδίοις γένηται καὶ ἀγῶσι καὶ σπουδαῖς, ἀφειδεῖ τοῦ σώματος. For a similar re-employment by Plutarch of extracted material, see below on B 157.

256 = Stob. 4.2.14

δίκη μὲν ἐστὶν ἔρδειν τὰ χρὴ ἔόντα, ἀδικία δὲ μὴ ἔρδειν τὰ χρὴ ἔόντα, ἀλλὰ παρὰτρέπεισθαι.

Justice is doing what needs to be done, injustice not doing what needs to be done but turning aside.

τὰ χρὴ ἔόντα: things which are ‘a must’. *χρὴ* here is a substantive (see Wilamowitz on Eur. *HF* 311). Von Fritz, *EH* 7 (1960), p. 264, wanted to see a connection between *τὰ χρὴ ἔόντα* in B 256 and the *χρεία* or ‘necessity, the mother of invention’ which appears as a factor in theories about human evolution (Diod. 1.8.9, etc.).

B 261 = Stob. 4.5.43

ἀδικουμένοισι τιμωρεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν χρὴ καὶ μὴ παρίεναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἄδικον καὶ κακόν.

It is needful to requite those who suffer wrong to the best of one’s ability and not to let it pass. To do so is right and good. Not to do so is wrong and bad.

B 262 = Stob. 4.5.44

καὶ οἱ φυγῆς ἄξια ἔρδουσιν ἢ δεσμῶν ἢ θωιῆς ἄξιοι, καταψηφιστέον καὶ μὴ ἀπολύειν· ὅς δ’ ἂν παρὰ νόμον ἀπολύῃ κέρδει ὀρίζων ἢ ἡδονῇ, ἀδικεῖ καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐγκάρδιον ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

And those whose deeds deserve exile or imprisonment or who deserve penalty are to be condemned and not set free. Whosoever contrary to law sets them free, determining the issue for gain or pleasure, does wrong and this must necessarily be on his heart.

ἡδονῇ: because he feels like it (cf. Thuc. 3.82.8:), perhaps because the defendants have put him in a good mood by telling jokes (cf. Ar. *V.* 567, Demosth. 23.206). Cf. Thuc. 3.40.2f., where *ἡδονῇ λόγων* ‘pleasure in arguments’ appears alongside pity and *ἐπιείκεια* as a motive for mistaken clemency.

B 174 = Stob. 2.9.3

ὁ μὲν εὐθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακηδής ἐστιν· ὅς δ’ ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῇ καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἔόντα μὴ ἔρδῃ, τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη, ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κακίζει.

εὐθυμος secl. Grilli: *εὐθύμως* Wilamowitz

The man ... borne on to just and lawful deeds rejoices waking and sleeping, is strong and free from care; but whosoever pays no heed to justice and does not do what is needful – for this man, all such things are a vexation, whenever he recalls any of them, and he is afraid and reviles himself.

The fragment is a comparison between two opposed careers, a *σύγκρισις* in two carefully constructed and formally corresponding halves. Each begins by characterizing a specific kind of behaviour with a double expression (‘just and lawful deeds’, ‘neglecting justice and not doing what is needful’) followed by a threefold account of its consequences. But the first half begins with a participial construction and culminates in a relatively simple trio of verbs (*χαίρει ... ἔρρωται ... ἀνακηδής ἐστιν*);

whereas the second opens with a relative clause and moves on to a *τρίκωλον* with an unexpected and disproportionately long first ‘limb’ – distinguished by a change of subject and by an abstract noun as its predicate (*τούτῳ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη*), as well as by a small subordinate clause (*ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῇ*) tacked on to it – before returning, with the simple verbs *δέδοικε... ἐωντὸν κακίζει*, to something like the construction of its predecessor. The effect of this forceful *variatio* is to bring the noun *ἀτερπείη* into the sharpest prominence.

A much more serious interruption of the symmetry in the fragment comes with *εὐθυμος*, especially if one construes it, as Diels did, in the obvious way as a noun with *ὁ μὲν*, making it the subject and understanding *ἐπιφερόμενος κτλ.* predicatively: ‘the man in good spirits, borne on to...’. There is nothing to balance this in the second half; and the fragment as a whole appears to be about the contrasting lives of the righteous and unrighteous (cf. Alfieri, p. 251 n. 630), not about the *εὐθυμος* and his unlabelled opposite number. The text, as transmitted, can just about be construed as saying ‘The *εὐθυμος*, righteous man that he is, has a joyous time, whereas the unrighteous have a miserable time’. But the fragment clearly culminates in the second half, and its argument would certainly be much more straightforward without the distracting force of *εὐθυμος* at the beginning. Von Arnim, *GGA* 11 (1894), 885, went so far as to find the text incomprehensible if the word remained there, while A. Grilli, ‘Nota su Democrito’, *Epicurea in Memoriam H. Bignone* (Genoa, 1957), pp. 69–72, argued at length that *εὐθυμος* must be an anthologist’s gloss on *χαίρει... ἔρρωται... ἀνακηδής ἐστιν* (all of them obvious aspects of *εὐθυμία*). Less drastically, Wilamowitz and others wished to read *εὐθύμῳς*, while Kranz would give *εὐθυμος* the force of an adverb (on the construction, see KG i.275): ‘the man borne on in good spirits to...’. He is probably right to reduce the importance of the word in this way (*contra* Ibscher, i.152–4). At all events, the opening words of this fragment are a very uncertain basis, on their own, for assertions about the righteousness of the Democritean *εὐθυμος* – if indeed one can talk of such a type at all. Elsewhere in the *fragmenta moralia*, the adjective occurs only once, in B 191 where it is used of souls. We have no reason to think of the *εὐθυμος* as a paradigmatic character in any way comparable to Aristotle’s *μεγαλόψυχος* or the *σοφός* in Hellenistic philosophy.

δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα: separated in a typically Democritean hyperbaton (cf. B 181, 297) from the *ἔργα* which they qualify, are virtually a hendiadys. So too are *δίκης ἀλογίη* and *τὰ χρή ἔοντα μὴ ἔρδει* in the second half of the fragment. (Cf. B 256, ... *ἀδικίη δὲ* (sc. *ἐστι*) *μὴ ἔρδειν τὰ χρή ἔοντα*.) In the present context, what is ‘right’, what is ‘lawful’ and what is ‘necessary’ are equivalent, and there is no hint of any conflict between Justice and Law, like that with which Epiphanius credits Democritus (A 166. See ‘Democritus on Politics’, §5).

καὶ ὕπαρ καὶ ὄναρ: cf. Epicurus, *Ep.* 3.135 (a passage which Ibscher, i.155f., would derive from this fragment).

ἀνακηδής: see above, on B 254.

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα: sc. *δίκη καὶ τὰ χρή ἔοντα*.

τευ: sc. *τῶν τοιούτων*.

ἀτερπείη: the most prominent word in the fragment (see above), recurs in a much discussed sentence, B 188: *ὁρος συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπία*, ‘the boundary-mark between things suitable and unsuitable is enjoyment and lack of enjoyment’. The sign that something agrees with you or is good for you is that you enjoy it; if you find it horrible, it cannot be doing you good. The principle applies primarily to questions of diet and physical well-being, but can be greatly extended. And it works in both directions. The fact that something agrees or disagrees with you

is a fact about yourself as much as about the thing: for a sick man, food which is sweet to a healthy man tastes bitter (Plato, *Prt.* 166e); its bitter taste is an indication of his sickness. In our fragment, the man who neglects justice has put himself in a position similar to that of the sick man. He can no longer hope to benefit from ‘just and lawful’ actions, from ‘justice and what needs be’; and his lack of enjoyment when he recalls any of them is an indication of the fact.

B 215 = Stob. 3.7.31

δίκης κῦδος γνώμης θάρσος καὶ ἀθαμβίη, ἀδικίης δὲ δείμα ξυμφορῆς τέρμα.

Justice’s glory: unabashed confidence of mind, injustice’s dread: a disastrous ending.

A troublesome jingle, the sentence is syntactically ambiguous in its second half. Its opening is fairly straightforward: ‘the glorious thing about justice is confidence of mind and ἀθαμβίη’. The poetic noun *κῦδος* (its only other appearance in prose is at Hdt. 7.8 a 2) can mean not only ‘glory’ but equally ‘grounds for glory’ (as at *Il.* 4.145 on which see H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* [München, 1962], p. 88 n. 14, and cf. Cicero’s use of *laus* at *off.* 1.19, ‘virtutis...laus omnis in actione consistit’, 63, 119). The no less poetic noun ἀθαμβίη, cited by Cicero (*fin.* 5.87) as a name for the Democritean *summum bonum*, occurs here for the only time in the *fragmenta moralia*, forming with θάρσος a hendiadys: ‘unabashed confidence’ (*pace* Ibscher, i.416).

Most translators of the second clause take δείμα with ξυμφορῆς, and understand ‘the conclusion of injustice is fear of disaster’. But the striking appearance of double homoioteleuton in both clauses (δίκης κῦδος, γνώμης θάρσος) and (ἀδικίης, δείμα, ξυμφορῆς, τέρμα) suggests that the nouns in both should be construed in the same order. (Hence Natorp, p. 103, presumably wishing to keep the standard translation, thought of transposing δείμα and τέρμα.) In that case, ἀδικίης δείμα will mean ‘what injustice has to fear’, with δείμα standing (as you would expect a noun ending in -μα to stand) for the *object* of fear rather than the process of fearing, while ξυμφορῆς τέρμα will be an ‘end consisting in disaster’ (cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 746, Eur. *Hippol.* 139f.). On this interpretation, Democritus is threatening the unjust with real (if unspecified) disaster – and not just with the *fear* of disaster, as Epicurus was to do (*RS* 17, 34).

B 297 = Stob. 4.52.40

ἔνιοι θνητῆς φύσεως διάλυσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ἄνθρωποι, συνειδήσει δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ βίῳ κακοπραγμοσύνης, τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ φόβοις ταλαιπωρέουσι, ψεύδεα περὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν μυθοπλαστούντες χρόνον.

Some men, not knowing the dissolution of mortal nature, but with a consciousness of ill-doing in life, toil out their time of life in perturbations and fears, fabricating lying legends about the time after the end.

θνητῆς φύσεως διάλυσιν: a vague phrase. The ‘dissolution of human nature’, a perishable combination of soul and body (cf. *Isoc.* 2.37, 15.180), need not itself mean that the soul disintegrates and that nothing further can happen to it (cf. Plato, *Grg.* 524b!), though that was what Democritus and later the Epicureans (*Lucr.* 3.838ff.) believed.

συνειδήσει...κακοπραγμοσύνης: here as elsewhere (e.g. B 191 *init.*), the choice, presumably for stylistic reasons, of abstract nouns in place of straightforward verbal or participial constructions results in compound ambiguity: *συνειδήσει* could mean knowledge about life in general or about their own lives (*συνειδότες ἑαυτοῖς*), while the implications of *κακοπραγμοσύνη* could either be those of ‘doing badly’ (*κακῶς*

πράσσειν) or of 'evil doing' (κακὰ πράσσειν). Diels adopted the first alternative in each case, as does Barnes ('aware of the wretchedness of life'). But Nestle, *Philologus* 67 (1908), p. 548, was surely right to argue that, if it is simply the misery in this life of which the men are conscious, they might more reasonably hope for a *better* hereafter; what fuels their anxieties about the after-life is their consciousness of having themselves acted badly. Moreover, *κακοπραγμοσύνη* (otherwise first attested at Demosth. 25.101) and its parent adjective *κακοπράγμων* (Xen. *HG* 5.2.36) elsewhere imply κακά – not κακῶς – πράττειν.

ταραχαῖς: this term with its appropriate suggestions of supernatural interference, mostly punitive (cf. Hdt. 1.32.1, Aesch. *Cho.* 239, Plato, *Lg.* 865e), is also the closest word in the *fragmenta moralia* to ἀταραξία, a noun which, according to Arius Didymus at A 167, Democritus used as a synonym for εὐθυμία, his 'end' in life. Cf. D.L. 9.45: τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν... καθ' ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει... ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμονίης.

μυθοπλαστέοντες: Rohde's objection, *Psyche*, Eng. Ed. (London, 1925), p. 408 n. 103, to the word as a 'monstrosity ... which sounds very late Greek' is unwarranted. Denominatives from compound nouns or adjectives may be a relatively late formation, but there are already 20 examples of them in Homer and 450 attested in classical Greek (see A. Debrunner, *Griechische Wortbildungslehre* [Heidelberg, 1917], p. 95), e.g. ἀνθρωποφαγέω (Hdt. 4.104) from ἀνθρωποφάγος, or, for that matter, εὐθυμέω. Like *κακοπραγμοσύνης*, *μυθοπλαστέοντες* is an example of the 'marvellous and magnificent diction' (Plut. 683a = A 77), the 'clarissima verborum lumina' (Cic. *Or.* 67 = A 34) which, in the eyes of some, gave Democritus' prose a poetic dignity.

χρόνου: as T. Birt (ap. Natorp, p. 189) points out, the hyperbaton here provides a rhythmic clausula: *μυθοπλαστέοντες χρόνου*, where the natural order would be *χρόνου μυθοπλαστέοντες*, rounds off the sentence with a double cretic. Its tendency to rhythm was another poetic element noted in Democritean prose (Cic. *loc. cit.*)

An ambitious piece of *Kunstprosa*, the fragment falls into roughly equal halves, subject and predicate, both of them composed of two more or less balancing members. Each of its four κῶλα introduces its own thought – (1) men ignorant of the facts about death, (2) but with a consciousness of evil doing, (3) live in fear and confusion (4) giving themselves nightmares about the afterlife; and they are linked to each other by various formal devices, above all by word-echo (εἰδότες... συνειδήσει, ἐν τῷ βίῳ... τῆς βιοτῆς, τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον... τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν... χρόνου). The artificial word-order of (4), all but two words of which are compressed between a definite article and its noun (τοῦ... χρόνου) reflects the still more artificial word-order of (1) which is entirely infixed in a noun-phrase (ἐνιοι... ἄνθρωποι), while (2) and (3) respond to each by ending each in a disyllable followed by a word of six syllables. In this formal way, they are encased between (1) and (4), which complement one another, too, in their content, since only those ignorant of human nature's dissolution can have fantasies about the after-life.

At Stob. 4.34.62, the text recurs in a mutilated version: ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι συνειδήσει τῆς ἐν τῷ βίῳ κακοπραγμοσύνης τὸν τῆς βιοτῆς χρόνον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ φόβοις τλαιπωρέουσι, ψεύδεα περὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν μυθέοντες φόβου.

B 248 = Stob. 4.1.33

ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων· δύναται δὲ, ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται πάσχειν εὖ· τοῖσι γὰρ πειθομένοισι τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν δέικνυται.

The law wishes to benefit the life of men; and it can do so, when they themselves wish to receive the benefit. To those who obey, it reveals their own excellence.

τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν: whose? ‘its own virtue’ or ‘their own virtue’? Probably ‘their’. Cf. B 245...κατ’ ἰδίην ἐξουσίην. Laws were in fact meant to make people good, providing an authoritative model for their lives. Plato’s Protagoras compares them to the lines drawn on a slate by a writing-master for the pupil to trace (*Prt.* 326cd). In prescribing what should or should not be done, the νόμος of a city served to mould the character and attitudes, the τρόποι, of its citizens. The laws of Sparta made men warlike, those of Athens encouraged a ‘democratic’ outlook, and so forth. Hence the commonplace that its πολιτεία, its complex of written and unwritten laws, is the ‘life’ or ‘soul’ of the city (Isoc. 7.14, 12.138; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1295a40ff.; Demosth. 24.210; etc.).

B 181 = Stob. 2.31.59

...κρείσσων ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν φανέται προτροπῇ χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ ἥπερ νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ. λάθρῃ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐξ τοῦ δέον ἡγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερώς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές. διόπερ συνέσει τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ὀρθοπραγέων τις ἀνδρείος ἅμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος γίγνεται.

The better will he prove who employs incitement to virtue and persuasion by discourse, rather than law and compulsion. For sinning in secret is the likelihood, when a man has been restrained by law from wrongdoing; but when he has been led to what he should by persuasion, there is no likelihood of his doing anything untoward, either in secret or openly. (Which is why one who acts uprightly through understanding and knowledge proves to be a man truly valorous and straight-minded as well.)

ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν...προτροπῇ: ‘incitement to virtue’. Cf. [Plat.] *Clitopho* 408d: τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν, Isoc. 2.8, etc. The hyperbaton is typically Democritean (cf. B 297, etc.).

λόγου πειθοῖ: not a pleonasm. There are non-verbal means of persuasion, e.g. bribery. Cf. B 51 (= Stob. 2.4.12 = Democrates 17): ἰσχυρότερος ἐς πειθῶ λόγος πολλὰκις γίνεται χρυσοῦ.

νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ: cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1180a211: ...ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν.

ἐς τὸ δέον is elliptical: ‘into *doing* what he should’. In B 41, διὰ τὸ δέον is still more elliptical: ‘through *knowledge* that one should *do so*...’.

οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερώς: a somewhat pointless variation on λάθρῃ, since even ‘the man restrained by law’ will avoid misbehaving φανερώς, this double phrase reappears at Democrates 80 (see below).

συνέσει τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ: perhaps, ‘intuitive understanding and technical competence’ (cf. Soph. *Ph.* 1057). *σύνεσις* is an Ionic word (though popular enough with Thucydides), *ἐπιστήμη* Attic and above all Platonic (see B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens* [Berlin, 1924], pp. 81ff.). Its presence here, perhaps simply to balance *συνέσει*, does lend the fragment a rather Socratic appearance. So do the following words.

ἀνδρείος ἅμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος: the adjectives perhaps cover the physical and intellectual aspects of the same general ἀρετή (cf. *Anon. Iambl.* 1.1: ...ἐάν τε σοφίαν ἐάν τε ἀνδρείαν...ἐάν τε ἀρετὴν ἢ τὴν σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς. At 3.1, ἀνδρείαν is replaced by ἰσχύν). More probably ἀνδρείος has wider connotations of ‘manly virtue’ in general (cf. B 214: ἀνδρείος οὐχ ὁ τῶν πολέμιων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τῶν ἡδονῶν κρέσσων...). A ‘courage’ which manifests itself as proper conduct even when one is alone will be something more than just ‘steadfastness in battle’. Based on understanding and knowledge, it recalls the courage envisaged in the *Laches* (194d9) as ‘a kind of wisdom’.

γίγνεται 'turns out to be', 'proves to be'. Cf. Tyrt. 12.20: οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεται ἐν πολέμῳ 'Solch ein Mann "wird" gut (= bewährt sich als gut) im Kriege' (H. Fränkel, op. cit. p. 385).

Turning from its original context, the fragment is strictly without a subject for its opening sentence. But it is clearly a *teacher* of virtue who will prove more effective if he uses exhortation etc. In the following sentence, a broad statement of probability (εἰκός), the subject changes to the pupil. The formulation of the passage, personal and participial throughout its three sentences, disguises the change. As arch an example as any of Democritean *Kunstprosa*, they contain no less than five *Zweigliederungen*, some more pregnant than others: ἐπ' ἀρετὴν... προτροπῇ καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ, νόμῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερώς, συνέσει τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἀνδρείῳ ἅμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος. Almost every phrase complements, echoes or contrasts with another. The antithetical ὑπὸ νόμου and πειθοῖ in the chiasmic second sentence summarize the two double expressions in the first, while the negative εἰργμένον ἀδικίης finds its positive complement in ἐς τὸ δέον ἡγμένον (cf. B 256, δίκη μὲν ἔστιν ἔρδειν τὰ χρῆ ἑόντα). The final sentence, cast in the same mesmerizingly balanced form as its predecessors, appears to be on the same subject as they are. It is not. Having dealt with the role of protreptic and persuasion in moral education and demonstrated their superiority (they will ensure that a person behaves 'as he should' at all times), Democritus turns aside to the broader and different question, familiar enough to readers of early Platonic dialogues, of virtue and knowledge, which he dispatches from the same practical point of view: the man whose upright conduct derives from understanding and knowledge is truly virtuous, because he too can be guaranteed to behave properly at all times.

Two 'golden *gnomai*' in the Democrates Collection may possibly derive from this passage. Its moral, formulated as a maxim for personal conduct, reappears at: B 41 = Stob. 3.1.95 = Democrates 7: μὴ διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι ἀμαρτημάτων, 'Hold back from sin, not through fear, but because you should', while the phrase οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερώς is the only Democritean element in Democrates 80 (cf. DEI 9) with its thoroughly un-Democritean sentiment: ἦν πιστεύῃ τις θεοὺς ἐπισκοπεύειν πάντα, οὔτε λάθρῃ οὔτε φανερώς ἀμαρτήσεται. See Luria, *RM* 78 (1929), p. 235.

B 178 = Stob. 2.31.56 (Δημοκρίτου)

πάντων κάκιστον ἢ εὐπετεῖν παιδεῦσαι τὴν νεότητα· αὕτη γὰρ ἔστιν ἣ τίκτει τὰς ἡδονάς, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κακότης γίνεται.

Δημοκρίτου Burchard: δημοκράτους MS

Ease is the worst education of all for youth; for this is what gives birth to those pleasures which lead to viciousness.

Δημοκρίτου: Burchard's emendation is easy enough. The corruption of *Δημοκρίτου* to *Δημοκράτους* occurs outside Stobaeus, e.g. at Porph. *Abst.* 4.21 (= B 160) and Schol. in Ap. Rhod. 3.533 (= B 161).

As so often happens in Stobaeus (see O. Hense, *RE* 9.2567–74), B 178 is the first in a group of quotations (Stob. 2.31.56–9 = B 178–81), the others of which are labelled simply τοῦ αὐτοῦ, 'same author'. Its ascription is thus of some importance. If B 178 is assigned to 'Democrates', so must they be. This fragment was decidedly awkward for the attempt by H. Laue, *de Democriti fragmentis ethicis* (Göttingen, 1921), to divide the *fragmenta moralia* between Democritus of Abdera and

Democrates of Aphidna. He sought to do so partly on grounds of content and style, partly on the principle that ‘Democrates’ could be corrupted to ‘Democritus’, but not vice versa. On grounds principally of content, he wished to treat B 178, 179 and 181 as the work of Democritus (pp. 73–9). But our one MS expressly ascribes them to ‘Democrates’. See R. Philippson, ‘Demokrits Sittensprüche’, *Hermes* 59 (1924), 369–419, pp. 371, 377.

νεότητα: ‘youth’ was regularly distinguished from ‘childhood’. Heracles in Prodicus’ fable is on the threshold ἐκ παίδων and the age in which νέοι become αὐτοκράτορες (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21). Any one under thirty could still be classed as νέος (1.2.35. See, further, O. Gigon, *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien* [Basel, 1956], pp. 13f.). B 178 is thus on a slightly different topic from B 179. But the difference is of minor importance here, and παιδεία would, anyway, be an ordeal associated primarily with adolescence.

B 179 = Stob. 2.31.57

ἔξω τί κως <τοῦ> πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες οὔτε γράμματα· ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην οὐδ’ ὅπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς.

ἔξω τί κως <τοῦ> πονεῖν Dihle: ἐξωτικῶς μὴ πονεῖν MS: aliter alii, cf. Wachsmuth, DK *ad loc.*

Should children slacken in any way from toil, they will learn neither letters nor music nor athletics, nor yet what most of all sustains virtue – respect. For it is very much from these that respect tends to arise.

The reading of L, our one MS here, is doubly difficult. (1) ἐξωτικῶς can perhaps be understood as equivalent to ξενικῶς, ‘in a foreign way’ (cf. Iamblichus, *V. Pyth.* 97:...οἰκονομίας...τὰς ἐξωτικὰς καὶ τὰς ξενικὰς), ‘nach Barbarenart’ (H. Gomperz saw it as a gloss on some Democritean word like ὀθνεῖως). But it seems much likelier that the original text had the three words ἔξω τί κως. Diels tried ἔξω τί κως ἢ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες, comparing the use of ἔξω ἢ at Hdt. 2.3.2, 7.228.4) and understanding the words as ‘if children are permitted anything other than toil’. This, roughly, is what the text must be saying. But (2) the present participle ἀνιέντες, if it is intransitive, as it must be here, means ‘desisting from’ rather than ‘being permitted,’ and it would normally be construed either with a participle (Hdt. 4.28.2, 125.2, etc.) or with a genitive (Thuc. 5.32.4, etc.). Hence the attraction of Dihle’s τοῦ, though this might also be governed by ἔξω (cf. Thuc. 5.97, Ar. *Rhet.* 1354a27, Demosth. 4.34, etc.). ἔξω τί κως <τοῦ> πονεῖν is, admittedly, somewhat pleonastic, but Democritus is quite capable of being long-winded. (The MS reading would be explained by the contraction of ἔξω τί κως into one word and contamination with some gloss like ὥστε μὴ πονεῖν). Or did Democritus in fact write the passive aorist ἀνεθέντες?

If the exact text remains uncertain, the general sense of the passage is clear enough. DK rightly recall Plato, *La.* 179a:...καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅτι βούλονται ποιεῖν.

συνέχει: ‘holds together,’ ‘sustains,’ rather than ‘comprises’. The fragment is concerned with inculcating virtue, not with defining it.

B 264 = Stob. 4.5.46

μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ μηδὲ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδῆσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἀνθρώποι· ἀλλ’ ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον.

...not one bit more respect mankind than oneself, not one bit more do evil if no one is to know, than if all mankind is, but respect oneself most of all, and let this law be established for the soul, so that one do nothing improper.

τοῦτον νόμον...καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον. DK translate ‘und das soll als Gesetz...aufgerichtet stehen, nichts zu tun, was ungeschickt ist’. But, if *μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἀνεπιτήδειον* is the *content* of the law, ὥστε is otiose; a plain infinitive would be the normal construction (cf. Plato, *Prt.* 322d). The law is rather, that one should *ἑαυτὸν αἰδεῖσθαι*; doing nothing *ἀνεπιτήδειον* is its consequence.

B 244 = Stob. 3.31.7

φαῦλον, κὰν μόνος ᾔης, μήτε λέξις μήτ’ ἐργάσι· μάθε δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων σε-
αυτὸν αἰσχύνεσθαι.

Even if you are alone, neither say nor do anything vile. Far more than in front of others, learn to feel shame in front of yourself.

μήτε λέξις μήτ’ ἐργάσι: the formulaic combination (on which see Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* [Basel, 1946], p. 43) is off the point. When alone, you are likelier to *think* evil than to *speak* it.

μάθε: *αἰδῶς* or *αἰσχύνῃ* for oneself does not come naturally (cf. M. Ant. 12.4): it has to be learned. Later writers, e.g. Seneca (*Ep.* 25.5f.) gave some thought to the matter. (See ‘Democritus on Politics’, § 5 fin.)

B 84 = Democrates 50

ἑωυτὸν πρῶτον αἰσχύνεσθαι χρεὼν τὸν αἰσχρὰ ἔρδοντα.

Before himself must he whose actions are shameful first feel shame.

B 264, 244 and 84 are clearly on the same subject. Inspired by Philippon (op. cit., p. 383), Luria goes so far as to print them as the same fragment (604). If in fact they derive from the same passage, they illustrate what could happen to Democritean writing in the course of its transmission. B 264 has been ripped from its original context and given no subsequent surgery. So much is clear from its very incomplete syntax – four infinitives without a governing main verb, the first three of them with the moral agent as the subject, the fourth with *νόμον*. To construe the passage, one must assume at least a *δεῖ* or *χρεών*. Quite possibly it was introduced by something like ‘one should also learn to’ (cf. B 244) or perhaps ‘a youth should also be taught to’ (cf. B 178, 179). In other words, the fragment is on the same broad topic of civic education as B 181 – it has come down to us, incidentally, among a group of ‘political’ fragments (B 261–6) in Stobaeus’ chapter ‘On Laws and Customs’ (4.2) – and it lays the same stress on the superiority of inner motives for good behaviour (conviction, ‘self-respect’) over social sanctions (‘law and compulsion’, public disapproval). Against that, B 244, preserved in a chapter *Περὶ αἰδοῦς* (Stob. 3.31), is a straightforward, free-standing commandment for personal conduct, somewhat trivialised by the addition of the formulaic ‘neither say nor do’ and by the deletion of the paradoxical ‘law for the soul’. In B 84, the coarsening has gone much further. Where B 264 and 244 were about preventing or prohibiting bad conduct, the reference to the future is now lost. The man who should ‘first feel shame before himself’ is already doing shameful things, and the sentence could be mistaken for one on the need for repentance, like B 43 (on which, see ‘Democritus on Politics’, § 2 fin.).

B 249 = Stob. 4.1.34

στάσις ἐμφύλιος ἐς ἑκάτερα κακόν· καὶ γὰρ νικέουσι καὶ ἡσσωμένοις ὁμοίη φθορή.

Strife within the group is an evil to both parties; to victor and vanquished alike comes the same destruction.

ἐμφύλιος means broadly ‘within the group’. It has no special reference to *φύλη* in any administrative sense. Cf. Hdt. 8.3.1 where *στάσις ἐμφυλος* refers to disagreement within the whole Panhellenic alliance.

B 250 = Stob. 4.1.40

ἀπὸ ὁμονοίης τὰ μεγάλα ἔργα καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς πολέμους δυνατὸν ἐργάζεσθαι, ἄλλως δ’ οὐ.

Through concord it is possible for states to accomplish great actions and wars, otherwise not.

ἔργα...ἐργάζεσθαι: cognate accusative. Cf. Hdt. 2.114.2, 115.2, 3.25.6, etc. The *ἔργα* are likeliest to be military ‘actions’ like the *ἔργον* at Marathon (Hdt. 9.27.5) or at Plataea (Plato, *Menex.* 241c).

For bizarre word-order, the sentence takes some beating. But cf. B 181 init. and 297 fin.

B 157 = Plutarch, *adversus Colotem* 32, 1126a

...ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων <οἱ> οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείωσαν· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν. ὦν Δημόκριτος μὲν παραινεῖ τὴν τε πολεμικὴν τέχνην μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν ἀφ’ ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Παρμενίδης δὲ...

πολεμικὴν MSS, Philippson, Langerbeck, Cataudella, Westman (*Plutarch's Schrift gegen Kolotes* [Helsingfors, 1955], 263–5), Einarson, Cole (*Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology* [Ann Arbor, 1967], p. 125 n. 44: *πολιτικὴν* Reiske, DK, Westman (Teubner Plutarchus VI 2),

‘...and let me see these accusations brought by men whose lives really have gone to managing households and serving the state’. But these are all the very men whom Colotes has been abusing. Among them, Democritus urges us to have ourselves thoroughly trained in the art of war, the most important of all arts, and to pursue those labours from which men derive things great and glorious. Parmenides...

The context of this quotation in Plutarch’s *adversus Colotem* is complex. The Epicurean Colotes has attacked a number of philosophers, including Democritus, for sceptical doctrines which ‘make life impossible’. But his own school, by its denial of divine intervention, makes political life impossible (c. 31). This would not matter if his opponents were frivolous and apolitical, like Antidorus and Bion. But they are not. They are all men whose lives have been lived *οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς*. C. 32 of *adversus Colotem* is a catalogue of their various contributions to political life. These include the purely military success of Melissus. Thus there is nothing in the context of this chapter, *pace* DK, to necessitate Reiske’s emendation of *πολεμικὴν* to *πολιτικὴν*. In the quotation from Democritus, *πολεμικὴν τέχνην* is a very adequate companion to *τοὺς πόνους*, since the ‘labours’ from which men derive ‘greatness and glory’ are likeliest to be military (cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 576f.). Quite possibly, Democritus is recalling Homer, *Od.* 12.116f.: *σχέτλιε, καὶ δ’ αὖ τοι πολεμητῆα ἔργα μέμηλε | καὶ πόνος*. He himself was credited with two treatises on the ‘military art,’ a *Τακτικόν* and a *Ὁπλομαχικόν* (D.L. 9.48).

The fragment is strictly about the military rather than the political art. But the

connections between the two were close. According to the Platonic Protogoras, *πολεμική τέχνη* is a 'part' of *πολιτική τέχνη* (*Prt.* 322b). With the words *οἰκομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς*, Plutarch may be recalling an earlier part of the same dialogue, Protogoras' account of his subject (318e) as *εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως...*.

Plutarch recalls the same Democritean quotation, or part of it, at *non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 19. The context there is that, since Epicurus' own love of glory is proven, his followers are sacrificing a major source of pleasure in feebly 'shunning public office, administration and friendship with kings, "from which derive things great and glorious for life (*ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ εἰς τὸν βίον γίνεσθαι*)"', as Democritus puts it' (1100c). This is simply a recollection of the Democritean phrase *ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ....* There is no reason to think that the words preceding it are Democritean, or that Democritus had advocated *φιλίας βασιλέων* as a source of glory. Friendship with kings was a theme of importance in Hellenistic, not Presocratic, philosophy (*SVF* iii.690–3, Epicurus fr. 6 and 556 Usener etc.).

Part of Plutarch's quotation at 1126a reappears with two slight modifications, in a Byzantine florilegium, the *Melissa* of Antonius (*Patrol. Gr.* 136.1124b), as *δεῖ τοὺς πόνοὺς διώκειν, ἀνθ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*. This is the one case of a sentence ascribed to Democritus in a collection other than those of Stobaeus or 'Democrates' which we have the evidence to regard as more or less a verbatim quotation. It is hardly enough, *pace* Luria (iii.601), to guarantee the authenticity of other sentences ascribed to him solely in florilegia like the *Melissa* (cf. DK ii.222).

B 245 = Stob. 3.38.53

οὐκ ἂν ἐκώλουν οἱ νόμοι ζῆν ἕκαστον κατ' ἰδίην ἐξουσίην, εἰ μὴ ἕτερος ἕτερον ἐλυμαίνετο. φθόνος γὰρ στάσις ἀρχὴν ἀπεργάζεται.

The laws would not prevent each one of us from living at his own discretion, were it not that one man harmed the other. For envy brings about the beginning of strife.

ἐξουσίην: the power (which the laws curtail) to do as you will. Cf. Lys. 14.11: *ἐνθυμηθῆναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἐξέσται ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος νόμους κείσθαι*, Anon. *II. Νόμων* [Demosth. 25].20: *λυθέντων γε τούτων* (sc. *τῶν νόμων*), καὶ ἐκάστω δοθείσης ἐξουσίας ὃ τι βούλεται ποιεῖν, Aristotle, *Pol.* 1318b39f. etc.

At first glance, the argument of the fragment is puzzling. It is hard to see how its second sentence fits on to the first. The laws have to intervene because people would harm each other, and such harm might well lead to strife. But hardly to envy, an emotion generally understood as vexation at the success of one's fellows (cf. Hdt. 7.237.2, and Aristotle's definition of *φθόνος* at *Rhet.* 1386b18–20 and 1387b22ff.: *λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγία φαινομένη...περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους*). The normal reaction to injury would be anger or resentment. Envy here is, rather, the *motive* which leads men to harm one another in the first place, and makes it necessary for the laws to intervene. Their function is twofold: to prevent the envious from wreaking harm, and (as Democritus says in the opening sentence) to *forestall* their envy, by curtailing the invidious inequalities which arise if each is allowed total *ἐξουσία* in the pursuit of his goals in life. In which case, they will be like the laws enacted by Solon and others preventing individuals from owning as much land as they pleased (Ar. *Pol.* 1266b16–18). Envy from fellow-citizens is a natural reaction which the outstandingly

successful must expect (cf. Thuc. 6.16.3, Pindar, *O.* 6.74, 8.55, *P.* 1.84f., *N.* 4.39, 8.21f., *I.* 2.43, etc. See G. M. Kirkwood, 'Blame and Envy in the Pindaric Epinician' (*Greek Poetry and Philosophy, Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury* [Toronto, 1984], 169–83), pp. 177f.

For some further reflections on B 245, see M. Nill, *Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus* (Leiden, 1985), p. 86.

B 255 = Stob. 4.1.46

ὅταν οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι καὶ προτελεῖν τολμέωσι καὶ ὑπουργεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη καὶ τὸ οἰκτίρειν ἔνεστι καὶ μὴ ἐρήμους εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐταίρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τοὺς πολιήτας ὁμονόους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ, ἅσσα οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναίτο καταλέξει.

καὶ <τὸ> μὴ ἐρήμους εἶναι...καὶ <τὸ> τοὺς πολιήτας ὁμονόους εἶναι Meineke

Whensoever those with means have the nerve to lend to those who have none, to do them services and kindnesses – that is when you first find pity and an end to isolation, the birth of comradeship, mutual assistance and concord among the citizens, and other blessings so many that none could count them.

οἱ δυνάμενοι: the upper classes (cf. Thuc. 6.39.2), the rich and powerful, in contrast to *τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι*.

προτελεῖν: literally, 'pay beforehand', hence 'advance money'. Cf. Xen. *An.* 7.7.15, *Ages.* 1.18, *Vect.* 3.9.

ὑπουργεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι: if *ὑπουργεῖν* means simply 'do favours, good turns, services' (Hdt. 8.110.3 etc.), *χαρίζεσθαι* 'show kindness' can imply, further, a measure of altruism (cf. B 96 and Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1385a17–19: *ἔστω δὲ χάρις* ('kindness')...*ὑπουργία μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδ' ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλὰ ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ*). Needless to say, the term can also imply favours done in expectation of a return; 'kindness' may and should also inspire 'gratitude' (another meaning of *χάρις*) and lead to mutual good will. Cf. Ar. *EN* 1133a3–5: *διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδωσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαρισάμενον*) and Cicero, *fin.* 2.117: '... *beneficium...gratia...quae sunt vincla concordiae*'.

οἰκτίρειν: pity is an emotion to which the rich and confidently prosperous, *οἱ ὑπερβυδαίμονεῖν οἰόμενοι*, are not normally susceptible (Ar. *Rhet.* 1385b21).

ἐρήμου: isolated, bereft of allies. To be 'bereft' of allies and 'comrades' who might provide 'defence' is a recognisable claim to pity (cf. Thuc. 3.57.4, 67.2, 3, 5).

ἐταίρους: very nearly 'comrades in arms', 'partners in crime', the word implies a certain equality of social status, as well as suggesting membership of a *ἐταιρεία*, a political faction or club organized for the *ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι*, the 'mutual defence', of its members.

δύναίτο καταλέξει: note the concluding 'paeonic' rhythm (as in Latin *esse videatur*). Cf. Cicero, *Orat.* 67.

A loosely written sentence, possibly amputated in transmission. The flaccid syntax of the apodosis – in which five infinitives (only three of them with the definite article and only one with an express subject) as well as *ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ κτλ.* all depend on *ἔνεστι* – makes it hard to determine just how many 'blessings' are being counted and whom they primarily concern. Meineke's restorations leave it with five articular infinitives, each potentially with a different subject. One could perhaps construe the unrestored text in the same way. Alternatively, one could take these clauses at their face value, as one single and two double articular infinitives. On either construction, there

remains the question of how they are linked to the protasis. ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη is unlikely to mean 'then already', 'hierin bereits' (DK), so much as 'herein at last' (Freeman), *tum demum, da vollends* (see the examples at KG ii.121f.), 'that really is when...'. Concord and the other blessings are presumably effects, rather than causes, of kindness by the rich to the poor. In that case, what about τὸ οἰκτιρεῖν? Pity surely is the *motive* for their generosity. Perhaps the stress of the verb is less on the feeling than on its expression or enactment: 'that is when pity is truly shown...' Secondly, if pity is shown by the rich, are they also the subject of μὴ ἐρήμους εἶναι? Quite possibly. Their benefactions might well gain them a fund of good will and a crowd of supporters (cf. Xen. *Oec.* 2.5: to maintain his status, Critobulus must, amongst other things, πολίτας δειπνίζειν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἢ ἔρημον συμμάχων εἶναι). But is it just the rich who are to 'become ἐταῖροι'? In this fragment, however we articulate the apodosis, there is a certain 'slide' of subject, rather as there is in B 181. For presumably it is all the citizens, rich and poor alike, who will now ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι, in the same way that they are all going to be 'in concord.' (If the word-order of καὶ τὸ ἀμύνειν ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τοὺς πολίτας ὁμονόους εἶναι seems strained, compare B 250.)

B 282 = Stob. 4.31.120

χρημάτων χρήσις ξὺν νοῷ μὲν χρησίμων εἰς τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καὶ δημωφελέα, ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ χορηγία ξυνή.

Use of money, with sense, is useful for being liberal and public-spirited: with folly, it becomes an expense for everyone.

ἐλευθέριον...καὶ δημωφελέα: cf. Aristotle, *EN* 1120a22f.: φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι...ὠφέλιμοι γάρ.

The sentence is notable for its assonance (χρημάτων χρήσις...χρήσιμων) and word play (ξὺν νοῷ...ξὺν ἀνοίῃ...ξυνή), which recalls the *bon mot* ascribed to Antisthenes: 'you need βιβλαρίου καινοῦ (= καὶ νοῦ) καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ (D.L. 6.3 = fr. 187 Caizzi; cf. Stilpo *ap.* D.L. 2.118, Isocrates *ap.* Theon *Progygmn* p. 209). Emending the last words of the sentence would spoil the joke. Cole's interpretation of them is surely right: 'The improvident giver's efforts to make up his losses from other sources transform an individual χορηγία into one whose burden is felt by the whole population' (*HSCP* 65 [1961], p. 162 n. 60). Cf. *Anon. Iambl.* 3.3f., Aristotle, *EN* 1121a30–b1.

Cf. B78 = Stob. 4.31.121 = Democrates 43: χρήματα πορίζειν μὲν οὐκ ἀχρεῖον, ἐξ ἀδικίης δὲ πάντων κάκιον, 'To provide money is not without use; to do so from dishonesty the worst of all.' A rehash of the preceding sentence?

B 96 = Democrates 62

χαριστικός οὐχ ὁ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ἀλλ' ὁ εὖ δρᾶν προηρημένος.

Truly kind is not he who looks to the reward, but he who has chosen to do a good turn.

χαριστικός: on the late fifth-century fashion for adjectives ending in -ικός see Denniston, *op. cit.* p. 19.

The sentence is one of four in the 'Democrates' Collection on the topic of χάρις. Two of them are straightforwardly counsels of prudence (B 94 μικραὶ χάριτες ἐν καιρῷ μέγισται τοῖς λαμβάνουσι, 'Small favours at the right point have the greatest effect on their recipients' and B 93 χαριζόμενος προσσέπτει τὸν λαμβανόμενον, μὴ κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῦ κίβδηλος ἐὼν ἀποδῶ, 'When doing a favour study the recipient, lest he be a cheat and return evil for good') while the third appeals to self-respect and

common justice (B 92 *χάριτας δέχεσθαι χρεῶν προσσκοπευόμενον κρέσσονας αὐτῶν ἀμοιβὰς ἀποδοῦναι*, ‘One should receive favours with an eye to returning them with interest’). The loftier altruism of B 96, however, has its contemporary parallels. Cf. Thuc. 2.40.4f. and Aristotle’s definition of *χάρης* (*Rhet.* 1385a17–19, quoted above on B 255).

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